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HTTP and HTTPS trafﬁc recorded at the perimeter of an organization is an exhaustive data
source for the forensic investigation of security incidents. However, due to the nested
nature of today's Web page structures, it is a huge manual effort to tell apart benign trafﬁc
caused by regular user browsing from malicious trafﬁc that relates to malware or insider
threats. We present Hviz, an interactive visualization approach to represent the event
timeline of HTTP and HTTPS activities of a workstation in a comprehensible manner. Hviz
facilitates incident investigation by structuring, aggregating, and correlating HTTP events
between workstations in order to reduce the number of events that are exposed to an
investigator while preserving the big picture. We have implemented a prototype system
and have used it to evaluate its utility using synthetic and real-world HTTP traces from a
campus network. Our results show that Hviz is able to signiﬁcantly reduce the number of
user browsing events that need to be exposed to an investigator by distilling the structural
properties of HTTP trafﬁc, thus simplifying the examination of malicious activities that
arise from malware trafﬁc or insider threats.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Network traces are one of the most exhaustive data
sources for the forensic investigation of computer security
incidents such as online fraud, cyber crime, or data leakage.
By observing the network trafﬁc between an internal
network and the outside world, an investigator can often
reconstruct the entire event chain of computer security
breaches, helping to understand the root cause of an inci-
dent and to identify the liable parties. In particular, the
investigation of HTTP trafﬁc is becoming increasingly
important in digital forensics as HTTP has established itself
as the main protocol in corporate networks for client-to-
server communication (Palo Alto Networks, November
2012). At the same time, malware, botnets and othergelmann).
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWStypes of malicious activities nowadays extensively rely on
HTTP communication (Dell SecureWorks, March 2014),
possibly motivated by the ubiquitous access to the Web
even in locations where Internet access is otherwise strictly
policed.
Manually analyzing HTTP trafﬁc without supportive
tools is a daunting task. Trafﬁc of a single workstation can
easily account for millions of packets per day. Even when
the individual packets of an HTTP session are reassembled,
the trafﬁc may exhibit an abundant number of requests.
This high number of requests results from how Web pages
are built today.When a browser ﬁrst loads aWeb page from
a server, dozens to hundreds of additional HTTP requests
are triggered to download further content, such as pictures
(Pries et al., 2012; Butkiewicz et al., 2011). These requests
may be addressed to the same server as the original page.
However, today's common practice of including remote
elements, such as advertisements or images hosted on. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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as well. Consequently, ﬁnding suspicious activities in a
network trace oftentimes resembles the search for a needle
in a haystack.
We present Hviz (HTTP(S) trafﬁc visualizer), a trafﬁc
analyzer that reconstructs and visualizes the HTTP and
HTTPS trafﬁc of individual hosts. Our approach facilitates
digital forensics by structuring, aggregating, and correlating
HTTP trafﬁc in order to reduce the number of events that
need to be exposed to the investigator.
Hviz reduces the number of HTTP events by combining
data aggregation methods based on frequent item set
mining (Borgelt, 2012) and domain name based grouping
with heuristics to identify main pages in HTTP requests
(Ihm and Pai, 2011; Xie et al., 2013). To support the inves-
tigator at ﬁnding trafﬁc anomalies, Hviz further exploits
cross-computer correlations by highlighting trafﬁc patterns
that are unique to speciﬁc workstations. Hviz visualizes the
aggregated events using a JavaScript based application
running in the Web browser.
Our main contributions are the following:
 We propose an approach for grouping and aggregating
HTTP trafﬁc into abstract events which help under-
standing the structure and root cause of HTTP requests
issued by individual workstations.
 We present Hviz, an interactive visualization tool based
on the proposed approach to represent the event
timeline of HTTP trafﬁc and explore anomalies based on
cross-computer correlation analysis.
 We evaluate the performance of our approach with
synthetic and real-world HTTP traces.
As input data, Hviz supports HTTP and HTTPS trafﬁc
recorded by a proxy server (Cortesi and Hils, 2014) and
HTTP network traces in tcpdump/libpcap format
(Tcpdump/Libpcap, 2015). We make Hviz's interactive
visualization of sample traces available at http://hviz.
gugelmann.com.
In the remainder of this paper, we formulate the prob-
lem in Section 2 and introduce our design goals and core
concepts in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our aggre-
gation and visualization approach Hviz. We evaluate our
approach in Section 5 and discuss evasion strategies and
countermeasures in Section 6. We conclude with related
work in Section 7 and a summary in Section 8.Problem statement
When a security administrator receives intrusion re-
ports, virus alerts, or hints about suspicious activities, he
may want to investigate the network trafﬁc of the corre-
sponding workstations in order to better understand
whether those reports relate to security breaches. With the
prevalence of Web trafﬁc in today's organization networks
(Palo Alto Networks, November 2012), administrators are
often forced to dig into the details of the HTTP protocol in
order to assess the trustworthiness of network ﬂows.
However, Web pages may exhibit hundreds of embedded
objects such as images, videos, or JavaScript code. Thisresults in a large number of individual HTTP requests each
time a user visits a new Web page.
As an example, during our tests, we found that users
browsing on news sites cause on average more than 110
requests per visited page. Even more problematic than the
mere number of requests is the fact that on average a single
page visit resulted in requests to more than 20 different
domains. These numbers, which are in line with prior work
(Pries et al., 2012; Butkiewicz et al., 2011), clearly highlight
that manually analyzing and reconstructing Web browsing
activity from network traces is a complex task that can be
very time-consuming.
Malicious actors can take advantage of this issue: Recent
analyses of malware and botnet trafﬁc have shown that the
HTTP protocol is often used by such actors to issue com-
mand and control (C&C) trafﬁc and exﬁltrate stolen data
and credentials (Dell SecureWorks, March 2014). Our aim is
therefore to support an investigator at investigating the
HTTP activity of a workstation when looking for malicious
activities, such that.
1. the investigator can quickly understand whichWeb sites
a user has visited and
2. recognize malicious activity. In particular, HTTP activity
that is unrelated to user Web browsing such as malware
C&C-trafﬁc should stand out in the visualization despite
the large amount of requests generated during Web
browsing.Design Goals and Concepts
We start this section by introducing our terminology.
Then, we present the underlying design goals and describe
the three core concepts behind Hviz.Terminology
For simplicity we use the term HTTP to refer to both
HTTP and HTTPS, unless otherwise speciﬁed. We borrow
some of our terminology from ReSurf (Xie et al., 2013). In
particular, a user request is an action taken by a user that
triggers one or more HTTP requests, e.g., a click on a hy-
perlink or entering a URL in the address bar. The ﬁrst HTTP
request caused by a user request is referred to as the head
request, the remaining requests are embedded requests. We
refer to a request that is neither a head nor an embedded
request as other request. These requests are typically
generated by automated processes such as update services
or malware. The sequence of head requests is the click
stream (Kammenhuber et al., 2006). We organize HTTP
requests of a workstation in the request graph, a directed
graph with HTTP requests as nodes and edges pointing
from the Referer node to the request node (see Section 4.1.1
for details).Design goals
The aim of Hviz is to visualize HTTP activity of a work-
station for analysis using input data recorded by a proxy
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cording to the following design goals:
I. Visualize the timeline of Web browsing activity (the
click stream) of a workstation such that an investi-
gator can quickly understandwhichWeb pages a user
has visited.
II. Support an investigator in understanding why a
particular service receives HTTP requests, i.e., if the
service receives requests as part of regular Web
browsing or because of a suspected attack or data
exﬁltration.
III. Reduce the number of displayed events to avoid
occlusion.
IV. Prevent HTTP activity from getting lost in the shufﬂe.
For example, a single request to a malware C&C
server should be visible among hundreds of requests
caused by regular Web browsing.Core concepts
Hviz relies on three core concepts:
1. To achieve design goal I, we organize HTTP requests in
the request graph and apply a heuristic (Xie et al., 2013)
to distinguish between requests that are directly trig-
gered by the user (head requests) and requests
happening as a side effect (embedded requests). The
sequence of head requests visualized in chronological
order provides the “big picture” of Web browsing ac-
tivity. The graph helps the understanding of how a user
arrived at a Web page (design goal II).
2. It might be tempting to reduce the visualization to head
requests in order to achieve the reduction of events
demanded by design goal III. However, this approach
comes with three drawbacks: (i) Typical malware cau-
ses HTTP requests that are unrelated to Web browsing
and, as a consequence, would disappear from the
visualization (conﬂict with design goal IV). (ii) Knowing
how head requests are identiﬁed, an attacker can
intentionally shape his HTTP activity such that mali-
cious activities are missed (conﬂict with design goal II).
(iii) Incorrectly classiﬁed HTTP requests become difﬁ-
cult to recognize and understand without the related
HTTP requests (conﬂict with design goal IV). Instead of
completely dropping non-head requests, we reduce the
number of visualized events by means of domain ag-
gregation and grouping based on frequent item set
mining. This way, the number of visualized events is
reduced (design goal III), while HTTP events that are not
part of regular Web browsing are still visible (design
goal IV).
3. To help decide if a request is part of regular Web
browsing, a suspected attack against a workstation, or
data exﬁltration (design goal II), Hviz correlates the
HTTP activity of the workstation under investigation
with the activity of other workstations in the network.
HTTP requests that are similar to requests issued by
other workstations can be faded out or highlighted
interactively.Hviz
Hviz uses several data processing steps to achieve its
goals of reducing the number of visualized events and
highlighting important activity. We describe these pro-
cessing steps in this section. Further, we introduce and
explain our choices for visualization.
Input data and architecture
Hviz can either operate on network packet traces or on
proxy log ﬁles. Packet traces are simple to record. However,
in packet traces it is typically not possible to access the
content of encrypted HTTPS connections. Thus, in a high-
security environment, an intercepting HTTP proxy
enabling clear-text logging of both HTTP and HTTPS mes-
sages may be preferable. Making the use of the proxy
mandatory forces potential malware to expose their trafﬁc
patterns.
Hviz currently supports HTTP and HTTPS trafﬁc recor-
ded by the mitmdump proxy server (Cortesi and Hils, 2014)
and HTTP trafﬁc recorded in tcpdump/libpcap format
(Tcpdump/Libpcap, 2015). We use a custom policy for the
Bro IDS (Paxson, 1999) to extract HTTP messages from
libpcap traces.
The architecture of Hviz consists of a preprocessor and
an interactive visualization interface. The preprocessorda
Python programdruns on the server where the HTTP log
data is stored. The visualization interface uses the D3
JavaScript library (Bostock et al., 2011) and runs in the Web
browser. We provide an overview of the processing steps in
Fig. 1, and explain each of the steps in the rest of this
section.
Building the request graph
As a ﬁrst step, Hviz analyses the causality between HTTP
requests, represented by the request graph. Fig. 1 illustrates
the process in box (A). Each node in the request graph
represents an HTTP request and the corresponding HTTP
response. If an HTTP request has a valid Referer header, we
add a directed edge from the node corresponding to the
Referer header to the node corresponding to the HTTP
request. For example, when a user is on http://www.bbc.
com and clicks a link leading him to http://www.bbc.
com/weather, the HTTP request for the weather page con-
tains http://www.bbc.com in the Referer header. In this
case, we add a directed edge from http://www.bbc.com to
http://www.bbc.com/weather to the graph.
Requests for embedded objects that are issued without
user involvement, e.g., images, usually also contain a
Referer header. To tell apart head requests (requests that
are directly triggered by the user) from embedded requests
(requests for embedded objects), Hviz relies on the ReSurf
heuristic (Xie et al., 2013). Hviz tags the identiﬁed head
nodes and memorizes their request times for later pro-
cessing steps.
Event aggregation
The sheer number of HTTP requests involved in visiting
just a handful of Web sites makes it difﬁcult to achieve a
high-level understanding of the involved activities. Thus,
Fig. 1. Schematic visualization of the processing steps in Hviz: (A) Recon-
struction of request graph from HTTP requests; (B) aggregation of embedded
requests to domain events; (C) aggregation of domain events to meta
events; (D) correlation between workstations to identify and fade out
popular events.
1 http://publicsufﬁx.org/.
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dropping, or by aggregating similar events. Dropping,
however, would violate design goal IV (see Section 3.2). For
example, only displaying head requests would render the
C&C trafﬁc trafﬁc caused by the Zeus spyware (Macdonald
andManky, 2014) undetectable, because the corresponding
requests are not (and should not be) classiﬁed as head re-
quests by ReSurf (Xie et al., 2013).As a consequence, we rely on aggregation for the visu-
alization purpose, and provide access to the details of every
request on user-demand. As a ﬁrst step, we visualize
embedded requests at the granularity of domains. Specif-
ically, we aggregate on the effective second level domain.1
For example, as shown in box (B) in Fig. 1, embedded re-
quests to subdomain-A.example.com and subdomain-
B.example.com are summarized to one domain event
with the effective second level domain example.com.
Nearly all Web sites include content from third parties,
such as CDNs for static content, advertisement and ana-
lytics services, and social network sites. As a result,
embedded objects are often loaded from dozens of do-
mains when a user browses on a Web site. Such events
cannot be aggregated on the domain level. However, the
involved third-party domains are often the same for the
different pages on a Web site. That is, when a user browses
on example.com and embedded objects trigger requests
to the third parties adservice-A.com, adservice-
B.com and adservice-C.com, it is likely that also other
pages on example.com will include elements from these
third parties. We use this property to further reduce the
number of visualized events by grouping domain events
that frequently appear together as event groups. Fig. 1 il-
lustrates this step in box (C). To identify event groups, we
collect all domain events triggered by head requests from
the same domain and group these domains using frequent
item set mining (FIM) (Borgelt, 2012).
This approach may suppress continuous activity to-
wards a single domain or domain group. Therefore, our
approach additionally ensures that HTTP requests which
occurmore than 5min apart are never grouped together. As
a result, requests which are repeated over long periods of
time appear as multiple domain events or multiple event
groups and can be identiﬁed by inspection.
Tagging popular and special events
By only looking at the visited URL or domain name, it is
often difﬁcult to tell if a request is part of regular Web
browsing or a suspected malicious activity. To help with
this decision, we introduce tagging of events.
Hviz correlates the HTTP activity of multiple worksta-
tions to determine the popularity of events. If an activity is
popular (i.e., seen in the trafﬁc of many workstations), one
should assume that it is regularWeb browsing and, as such,
probably of little interest. We measure the popularity of an
event by counting on how many workstations we see re-
quests to the same domain with the same Referer domain,
i.e., the same edge in the request graph. For example, in box
(D) in Fig. 1, we calculate the popularity of the domain
event adservice-C.com, by counting on how many
workstations we see an edge from example.com to
adservice-C.com. If this edge is popular, it is most likely
harmless. We tag a node as popular if the popularity of all
incoming edges (event groups can have multiple incoming
edges) is greater than or equal to a threshold. The threshold
can be interactively adjusted in Hviz.
Fig. 2. Screenshot of Hviz visualizing Web browsing activity of an author of this paper. The main window shows the click stream and event summaries. The
smaller window shows HTTP request details and allows to search the content. The click stream is visualized as a graph in the main window. Head requests (green
nodes) are ordered by time on the y-axis. Groups of embedded domains (purple nodes) and single domains (blue nodes) branch to the right. The size of the nodes
is proportional to the outgoing HTTP volume (plus a constant). The node size scaling factor can be interactively adapted by using the slider at the top of the
window. The second slider at the top adjusts the popularity threshold used to fade out nodes. Data uploads are marked with red hatches. (For interpretation of
the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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during an investigation. We tag ﬁle uploads because up-
loads can be hints on leakage of sensitive information.
Nodes with upload data are never aggregated to event
groups and not tagged as popular. In addition, the uploaded
payload is reassembled and made available in the visuali-
zation. For demonstration purposes we limit ourselves to
ﬁle uploads. However, the tagging system is extensible. In
the future, we intend to incorporate additional information
sources such as Google Safe Browsing,2 abuse.ch, or
DNS-BH.3
Visualization
The browser-based visualization interface of Hviz con-
sists of a main window and an optional pop-up window2 https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/.
3 http://www.malwaredomains.com/.showing HTTP request details (see Fig. 2). The main win-
dow shows the visualization of the reduced request graph
and a panel on the left with additional information. At the
top of the windowwe provide two boxes with visualization
controls.
Events are displayed as nodes, and the Referer rela-
tionship between events corresponds to directed edges.
The size of nodes is proportional to the outgoing HTTP
volume (plus a constant). Hviz fades out the (probably
innocuous) popular nodes to reduce their visual impact.
Head requests are visualized as green nodes and placed
along the vertical axis in the order of arrival. This enables
the investigator to follow the click stream by simply
scrolling down. To keep the visualization compact and
well-structured, embedded events are branching to the
right, independent from their request times. Domain
groups are displayed in purple color, domain events in blue.
Other requests without Referer, e.g., software updates
triggered by the operating system or malware requests, get
the color yellow (see Fig. 5). Hviz highlights special events.
Fig. 3. Head node detection performance. Every marker is a run with
different parameters. The original ReSurf conﬁguration is shown as dot, the
conﬁguration with highest F1-measure as triangle.
Table 1
Parameters and head node detection performance.
Parameter name ReSurf Hviz
min_response_length 3000 3000
min_time_gap 0.5 3
min_referrals 2 2
head_as_parent True False
Performance ReSurf Hviz
Recall 80% 81%
Precision 75% 90%
F1-measure 78% 86%
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importance in data exﬁltration, Hviz displays HTTP re-
quests containing a body using red hatches.
Hviz initially assigns a ﬁxed position to head nodes and
their ﬁrst hop children. For positioning of second hop and
higher children, we rely on D3's force-directed layout
(Bostock et al., 2011). At any time, an investigator can toggle
the positioning of a node between force-layout and ﬁxed
position with a double-click, or move a node around to
improve the choices of the automated layout.
The panel on the left displays information on the
currently selected event, such as the names of the involved
request and Referer domains and the total number of re-
quests represented by an event. The two boxes at the top
provide sliders for the node size scaling, popularity
threshold, and control of the force layout, e.g., adjusting the
amount of force pulling ﬂoating nodes to the right. When a
user clicks on “Show request details” in the left panel, a
pop-up window appears providing further details on the
currently selected event. This includes the timestamp,
request method, URL, and parent URL. Hviz reassembles ﬁle
uploads and makes them available in the pop-up window
as well. Because the pop-up window shows a single
document that is linked to Hviz's mainwindowusing HTML
anchor tags, the pop-up window can as well be used for
free text search when looking for speciﬁc events.
Evaluation and usage scenarios
In this section, we investigate how powerful Hviz's
visualization is. We ﬁnd improved parameters for the
ReSurf (Xie et al., 2013) heuristic, and examine how much
aggregation and popularity ﬁlter can help in reducing the
number of events. We discuss scalability and conclude this
section with showcases demonstrating how Hviz handles
speciﬁc incidents.
Head node detection performance
Correctly identiﬁed head nodes greatly support an
investigator during analysis. Thus a high detection perfor-
mance is desirable. In order to understand the inﬂuence of
parameters on the ReSurf (Xie et al., 2013) heuristic, we
perform a parameter investigation.
For privacy reasons, we rely on synthetic ground truth
traces. We create these traces using the Firefox Web
browser and a browser automation suite called Selenium
(Selenium- Browser Auto, 2015). We instruct Firefox to visit
the 300 most popular Web sites according to Alexa4 as of
July 2014. Starting on each landing page, the browser
randomly follows a limited number of links which reside on
the same domain as the landing page. The number of links
is selected from a geometric distribution with mean 5, and
the page stay time distribution is logarithmic normal5 with
m ¼ 2.46 and s ¼ 1.39, approximating the data reported by
Herder (Herder, 2006). We note that not all of the top sites
are useful for our purposes, for two reasons. (i) Some of the4 http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/CH.
5 Note that m and s describe the underlying normal distribution.sites do not provide a large enough number of links, e.g.,
because they are entirely personalized. (ii) As we detected
later, some sites can only be browsed via the HTTPS pro-
tocol, yet we only recorded packet traces. Still, in total, our
dataset covers the equivalent of 1.3k user requests and
contains 74k HTTP requests.
We perform parameter exploration in order to optimize
the detection performance. In Table 1, we summarize our
ﬁndings, and Fig. 3 shows the recall and precision values
achieved for different parameters. The difference regarding
min_time_gap may result from differences in the utilized
traces, or from the way that the time gap is measured.
Unfortunately ReSurf does not exactly specify at which time
the gap starts. We achieve the highest F1-measure with
head_as_parent ¼ False. As a consequence head nodes are
detected independently from each other. In contrast, if
using the original ReSurf conﬁguration, missing a head
node would cause all following head nodes in the request
graph to remain undetected too.Aggregation performance
The main purpose of Hviz is to assist in understanding
the relations in HTTP trafﬁc. For an investigator, what
matters is the time he spends on getting an accurate un-
derstanding. As this time is difﬁcult to assess, we instead
rely on the number of events that need to be inspected as
an indicator for the time an investigator would have to
invest.
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We collected TCP port 80 trafﬁc of 1.8 k clients in a
university network over a period of 24 h. In total, this
corresponds to 205 GB of download trafﬁc and 7.4 GB of
upload trafﬁc from 5.7 M HTTP requests. 1.0k of the clients
contact at least 50 different Web servers. We randomly
select 100 of these clients and measure how Hviz would
perform during an investigation of their HTTP activity.
Within this set of 100 clients, the median client issued 36
head requests and triggered 2.4 k HTTP requests in total. To
protect user privacy we refrain from visualizing HTTP ac-
tivity based on this dataset, but limit ourselves to produc-
ing aggregated statistics.
Domain- and FIM-based grouping
Hviz groups HTTP requests to domain events and
further aggregates these events using frequent item set
mining (FIM). We calculate the reduction factor for these
steps as the number of all HTTP requests issued by an IP
address divided by the number of events remaining after
grouping. Fig. 4 shows the results for our 100 sample cli-
ents. We achieve a 7.5 times reduction in the median, yet
the factors for the individual clients range from 3 to more
than 100.
Popularity-based ﬁltering
As next step, we evaluate the effect of Hviz's popularity
ﬁlter. This ﬁlter identiﬁes, with the granularity of SLDs,
popular referrals, i.e., when (Referer domain, request
domain)-pairs are originated from many hosts. We deem
these events most likely innocuous, and, as a consequence,
these events are tagged as popular events and faded out in
the visualization (see Section 4.1.3). For this analysis, we set
the popularity ﬁlter threshold to 10. We then calculate the
reduction factor as the number of all HTTP requests issued
by a client divided by the number of HTTP requests that are
not tagged as popular. The reduction factor for our 100
sample clients is displayed in Fig. 4. The median reduction
factor is 2.9. Interestingly, a small number of clients does
barely beneﬁt from popularity-based ﬁltering, indicating
special interests.
Overall effectiveness of Hviz
We use the term active events to refer to the (not faded
out) events remaining after applying domain- and FIM-Fig. 4. Filtering and aggregation performance as box plots. The red lines in
the boxes represent the medians.based grouping, and popularity ﬁltering. Again, we
choose 10 as the threshold for the popularity ﬁlter. We
calculate the overall reduction factor as the number of all
HTTP requests issued by a client divided by the number of
active events. Overall, Hviz achieves a 18.9 times reduction.
Fig. 4 shows a box plot of the distribution over the 100
sample clients.
Formostclients, domain-andFIM-basedgrouping ismore
effective than applying the popularity ﬁlter. For example, we
found one client which extensively communicated with a
single, unpopular service. In this case, the popularity ﬁlter is
almost ineffective.Yet, since these requestsare targeted tothe
same domain they can be very well grouped. Overall, the
number of HTTP requests of this client is more than 190 fold
higher than its number of active events.
We also have evidence of the opposite, i.e., the popu-
larity ﬁlter being highly effective yet domain- and FIM-
based grouping not working well. For example, one client
issued almost all requests to a variety of popular services.
Popularity ﬁltering therefore reduces the number of events
by almost a factor of 50.
When comparing grouping with popularity reduction
factors we ﬁnd no correlation, thus we infer that these two
reduction methods work (largely) independently. Consid-
ering all 100 clients, the median 2.4 k raw HTTP requests
are reduced to a far more approachable 135 active events
per client. The median reduction factor is 18.9.
Scalability
We evaluate scalability according to two criteria, (i) the
time required to prepare data for visualization, and (ii) the
interactivity of the visualization. In order to estimate the
scalability of the data processing step, we measure the
processing time when analyzing the above dataset. The
dataset in libpcap format includes 212 GB of HTTP trafﬁc in
total, covering 24 h of network activity of 1.8k users. Pro-
cessing is CPU-bound. Running on one CPU of an Intel Xeon
E5-2670 Processor, it takes 4 h to extract HTTP requests and
responses. Building and analyzing the request graphs for
the 100 analyzed clients from the preprocessed data takes
30 min. We conclude that the data processing scales up to
thousands of clients.
To investigate the scalability of the visualization, we
perform tests with artiﬁcial traces of incrementing size. Our
experience shows that Hviz can handle graphs with up to
10 k events before the interactivity of the display becomes
sluggish. This corresponds to 5 times the number of events
generated by the busiest client in the 24 h trace. Visuali-
zations containing more than 10k nodes can be split in the
time domain into multiple smaller parts.
Use cases
In this section, we give three examples to further illus-
trate how Hviz aggregates and visualizes malicious HTTP
activity.
Visualization of Zeus malware activity
The Zeus malware family belongs to the most popular
trojans specialized on stealing credentials (Dell
SecureWorks, March 2014). As a ﬁrst use case, we show
Fig. 5. Hviz visualizing Zeus trojan activity taking place during regular Web
browsing. The C&C server of this Zeus variant was located at green-
valleyholidayresort.com. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Hviz visualizing data leakage to a Web server via HTTP GET requests.
The obfuscated upload clearly stands out as large node even though the total
upload size is less than 2 MB. The large node has an incoming edge and is
still yellow because it groups requests with and without Referer. (The name
of the server used for this experiment is anonymized in the screenshot.).
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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with Zeus.
We synthesize an example trace by merging a Zeus
trafﬁc sample and a short sample of a Web browsing ses-
sion. Fig. 5 shows the visualization of the synthetic trace.
The C&C server of this Zeus malware sample was located at
greenvalleyholidayresort.com.6 Zeus does not set
fake Referer headers, i.e., Zeus does not attempt to pretend
that its communication is part of regular Web browsing
(see Section 6). As a consequence, the Zeus bot's ﬁrst
requestda request for the bot conﬁgurationdis an un-
connected yellow node. The following requests are used to
exﬁltrate data from the infected workstation to the C&C
server. Hviz highlights the corresponding uploads using red
hatches, enabling an investigator to spot these uploads.
This trace additionally contains Windows update back-
ground trafﬁc and background trafﬁc to Google. Requests
without Referer to microsoft.com and google.com
occur on many workstations, that is why the popularity
ﬁlter fades out these events.
Visualization of data leakage
In the second use case, we show that data leakage as
small as a fewmegabytes becomes well visible in Hviz. The
reason is that Hviz scales nodes according to outgoing
trafﬁc volume. To create a scenario that is more challenging
than a simple ﬁle upload, we (i) use regular Web browsing
as background noise during the data upload and (ii)
obfuscate the upload by splitting the ﬁle into small chunks,
and transmitting each of these chunks as URL parameter in6 The domain has been deleted since.a request of its own. The total upload volume is less than
2 MB. Most importantly, the splitting step prevents simple
HTTP POST and request size detectors from triggering an
alarm. This includes Hviz, which does not mark the node
with red hatches as an upload.
Still, as demonstrated in Fig. 6, the ﬁle upload becomes
apparent due to the upload volume based sizing of nodes.
Because all HTTP requests containing the uploaded data
have been sent within a minute, Hviz aggregates these
uploads into one single event which is rendered as a single
large node. In order to avoid this aggregation, an attacker
could distribute the requests over prolonged periods of
time or over many different domains. However, in the
visualization Hviz would create many smaller nodes.
Dozens or even hundreds of singular eventsmay again raise
attention.
Visualization of DFRWS 2009 forensic challenge
As a third use case, we visualize a publicly available pcap
trace ﬁle7 from the DFRWS 2009 Forensics Challenge
(DFRWS, 2009). In short, the task of this challenge is to ﬁnd
evidence that a hacker named nssad had published “inap-
propriate” images of the Mardi Gras carnival event in New
Orleans. The suspect claims he was not responsible for any
transfer of data. The pcap trace ﬁle has been recorded
during early surveillance of the subject. It contains more
than 800 HTTP requests.
Within the data set, Hviz identiﬁes 41 head nodes. In
Fig. 7, we show an excerpt of the visualization. We can
instantly see search requests to Yahoo regarding the Mardi7 http://www.dfrws.org/2009/challenge/imgs/nssal-capture-1.pcap.
bz2.
Fig. 7. Hviz visualizing HTTP data of the DFRWS 2009 Forensics Challenge
(DFRWS, 2009). The displayed excerpt immediately shows that a user visited
yahoo.com, searched for mardi gras and mardi gras king cake, and visited the
found Web sites. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
8 For brevity, we only use malware as example, but the same principles
apply to any kind of attacker.
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Given the consistent request graph with normal head
nodes (green) and corresponding requests for embedded
objects (blue) it appears plausible that the Web pages have
been visited with a regular Web browser during normal
browsing. In contrast, malware would in all likelihood not
query for the embedded objects nor set appropriate Referer
headers.
The visualized excerpt shows that the user ﬁrst visited
yahoo.com, searched for mardi gras, and then visited
mardigrasneworleans.com by following a link on
yahoo.com. On this Web site, the user then navigated to
kingcakes.html. Next, the user went back to yahoo.com
and reﬁned the search to mardi gras king cake. On the re-
sults page, the user then followed a link to
wikipedia.org.
In short, based on Hviz's visualization an investigator
can instantly see that (i) multiple Web sites related to
Mardi Gras have been visited, (ii) these Web sites were
most likely visited during regular Web browsing of a user
and (iii) the user had been deliberately searching for these
Web sites and did not arrive there by accident.
Evasion strategies and defense
The quality of the visualization in Hviz is dependent on
the reliability of the head node classiﬁcation heuristic. This
means that a better heuristic can lead to bettervisualization results, as well as that an attacker can try to
subvert the classiﬁcation heuristic to complicate analysis of
an incident. In this section, we discuss the consequences of
head node misclassiﬁcation, and their potential for at-
tackers to hide their attack. For this discussion, we assume
that all HTTP and HTTPS trafﬁc of the attacker is available in
clear-text. This can be achieved by the mandatory use of an
intercepting Web proxy.
We start by taking a look at what happens when a head
node is mis-classiﬁed. If a node is labeled as head node
while it should not be labeled as such, it will appear in
Hviz's visualization in the time-line on the left and be
colored in green. Oftentimes, an investigator can spot these
nodes based on hints in the displayed URL. In the opposite
casedif a true head node is classiﬁed as non-headdthere
are two possible outcomes: (i) If the node has a valid
Referer it is placed together with the other embedded
nodes and groups. (ii) If the node does not have a valid
Referer it is rendered in yellow. For both cases, these mis-
classiﬁed nodes generally exhibit a larger than usual tree
of child nodes and can thus be spotted as well. Currently,
we entirely rely on the ReSurf heuristic (Xie et al., 2013) for
head node classiﬁcation. However, replacing ReSurf with
any other (and possibly better) heuristic is trivial, should
ReSurf ever turn out to be a limiting factor.
So which attack vectors does this open for malware8?
HTTP requests from malware not setting a valid Referer
header will appear as yellow nodes in the visualization
(Section 5.3.1). Therefore, in order to hide, the malware has
to forge valid Referer headers, e.g., by issuing an initial
request to an innocuous Web site and further on utilizing
this Web site's URL as Referer. In addition, to hide among
the popular Web sites, malware has two options. (i) If the
install base is large enough the malware is classiﬁed as
popular on its own. An investigator can defend against this
attack by using historic data for the popularity analysis. (ii)
Malware can imitate request patterns of popular Web sites,
i.e., the secondary-level domains (SLDs) of both Referer
header and Host header have to be identical to those in
popular HTTP requests. This can be achieved by, e.g.,
exploiting a popular Web site, or by crafting Host headers
not related to the contacted IP addresses. Fake host headers
can be mitigated by the mandatory use of a Web proxy, or
by additional checks on the Host name-to-IP address
relationship.
If a popular Web service is (mis-)used as C&C-channel
Hviz may fade out the relevant communication using the
popularity ﬁlter, provided that the service is popularly used
inside the attacked network. However, all related
communication data remains visible and available to the
investigator. Depending on communication frequency,
repeated access patterns may become apparent.
To sum up, the use of a Web proxy and preservation of
historical popularity data help to prevent attackers from
forging arbitrary requests and from hiding their commu-
nication. In addition, we want to emphasize that Hviz does
never suppress data. Thus, even if there is no historical
D. Gugelmann et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S1eS11S10popularity data available, an investigator can still recon-
struct an incident with Hviz.Related work
Analyzing and reconstructing user click streams: In
order to understand user search activity, Qiu et al. (2005)
introduced the term Referer tree as the sequence of all
pages visited by a user (Qiu et al., 2005). In the heuristic
utilized by Qiu et al. (2005), HTTP objects with content
type text are characterized as user requests.
Kammenhuber et al. (2006) introduced a state machine to
identify the sequence of pages visited by a user, coined
“clickstream” (Kammenhuber et al., 2006). Stream-
Structure (Ihm and Pai, 2011) and ReSurf (Xie et al., 2013)
improve on prior work by developing heuristics that allow
to distinguish more reliably between user requests and
embedded requests, thus enabling analysis of today's
complex Web sites. Our work utilizes the ReSurf heuristic
(Xie et al., 2013). ClickMiner (Neasbitt et al., 2014) is a
more involving approach that actively replays recorded
HTTP trafﬁc in an instrumented browser to reconstruct
user requests. In contrast to (Xie et al., 2013; Neasbitt et al.,
2014), our focus is on aggregation and visualization, not on
detection of user requests. Indeed, any heuristic identi-
fying user requests could be used by our visualization
approach.
Detecting HTTP-based malware: Perdisci et al. (2010,
2013) target on the detection of malware with HTTP C&C-
channels. BotFinder (Tegeler et al., 2012) uses a content-
agnostic approach suitable to detect HTTP based malware.
These approaches rely on machine learning the behavior of
malware from sample traces. In contrast, Hviz identiﬁes
common and thus probably boring trafﬁc patterns and
makes these patterns less prominent in the visualization.
As a consequence, trafﬁc that is unique to a workstation
becomesmore pronounced in the visualization. Zhang et al.
(2012) and Burghouwt et al. (2013) both organize HTTP
requests in a graph and correlate the graph with user ac-
tions in order to detect requests issued by malware. While
their approaches rely on recording user actions such as
mouse clicks and keystrokes, Hviz operates on network
trafﬁc only.
Visualization of network activity: Most work on
visualizing network activity aims at identifying anomalies
and consequently investigates network trafﬁc as a whole.
Shiravi et al. (2012) present an overview of the existing
large body of work in this context (Shiravi et al., 2012).
Our work is complementary to these approaches by
providing a tool to understand the relationships in HTTP
trafﬁc of a single workstation. The main idea is to use an
existing solution such as NetGrok (Blue et al., 2008) or
AfterGlow (Marty, 2014) to identify suspicious worksta-
tions and then utilize Hviz to inspect the HTTP activity of
that workstation in detail. NetWitness Visualize
(NetWitness Visualize, 2014) displays transmitted ﬁles
and data in an interactive timeline. Since this visualiza-
tion focuses on showing the ﬁles contained in HTTP
trafﬁc, it is not suitable for exploring the dependencies
between Web objects.Summary and future work
We present our HTTP trafﬁc analyzer Hviz. Hviz visu-
alizes the timeline of HTTP and HTTPS activity of a work-
station. To reduce the number of events displayed to an
investigator, Hviz employs aggregation, frequent item set
mining and cross-correlation between hosts. We show in
our evaluation with HTTP traces of real users that Hviz
displays 18.9 times fewer active events than when visual-
izing every HTTP request separately while still preserving
key events that may relate to malware trafﬁc or insider
threats.
As future work, we plan to incorporate additional in-
formation for event tagging, such as Google Safe Browsing,
and more details on uploads and downloads.Acknowledgement
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